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The Social Self of Whitehead’s
Organic Philosophy
Olav Bryant Smith
1 Alfred  North  Whitehead’s  philosophy  has  commonly  become  known  as  process
philosophy. Whitehead himself regarded his philosophy as the philosophy of organism.
His organic philosophy is understood through various types of process that occur in the
becoming  of  actual  organic  entities  in  relationship  with  one  another.  Whitehead’s
conception of the self is one that provides an alternative foundation for psychology, helps
to make sense of personal identity over time amidst a series of changing experiences, and
offers  a  ground for  understanding an ethic  based on shared bonds between self  and
world. The mind-body problem is solved in the philosophy of organism, and a ground for
understanding the lived body is provided.
2 This paper begins with Whitehead’s deconstruction of the modern analysis of the self, and
then discusses in turn Whitehead’s “reformed” ontology and theory of perception, the
becoming of a single occasion of experience, the development of societies of occasions of
experience,  the creation of  self-identity over time as  a  society displaying a  selective
pattern or “unity of style.” The paper concludes with a discussion of this social self, in the
context of evolution, displaying an enjoyment and expression of lasting value through a
series of fleeting activities of individual occasions of experience.
⁂
3 Whitehead’s philosophy of organism would not have been created were it  not for an
analysis  of  the relations  between the self  and world.  In  what  Whitehead termed his
reformed subjectivist  doctrine,  he begins as Descartes did with the analysis of an act of
experience, and then searches for an adequate model of the self and its experience.
4 Whitehead believed that modern philosophy’s difficulties stem from a worldview that he
referred to as Subjectivist Sensationism. Previous models of the self had been thrown off by
the stress laid upon one, or other, of three misconceptions:
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The substance-quality doctrine of actuality.
The sensationalist doctrine of perception.
The  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  objective  world  as  a  construct  from  subjective
experience. (Whitehead 1978: 156)
5 Due to overconfidence in the power of ordinary language to reveal the inner workings of
nature, the Greeks’ ontology of qualities inhering in underlying substances were a direct
result of analyzing subject-predicate propositions where the subjects were place-holders
for ascribed predicates.  Subjects endured in narratives through numerous predicative
changes, and thus, substances endured while experiencing only qualitative changes over
time. So, on the modern theory, the self’s perception of the environing world, (the self
being  such  an  enduring  substance),  was  sensationalist,  with  only  such  predicative
descriptions being perceivable through the senses. The German idealist movement then
began with  Kant’s  model  of  the  self  beginning from such a  subjective  sensationalist
starting point, and expressing an objective world resulting from that experience.
The combined influence of these allied errors has been to reduce philosophy to a
negligi- ble influence in the formation of contemporary modes of thought. Hume
himself  introduces  the  ominous appeal  to  ‘practice’  –  not  in  criticism  of  his
premises,  but  in  supplement to  his  conclusions.  Bradley,  who repudiates  Hume,
finds  the  objective  world  in  which  we  live,  and  move,  and have  our  being
‘inconsistent if taken as real.’ Neither side conciliates philosophical conceptions of
a real world with the world of daily experience. (Whitehead 1978: 156)
6 Whitehead was searching for a model of the self and its experience of the world that was
adequate to our experience. Hume’s phenomenal theory, as Hume himself attests, had to
be set aside when he got up from his desk in order to get on practically with life. Idealists,
and other postmodern approaches that accept Kant’s model of the synthesis of the self’s
experience from the subjective to an objective construction, find the external world to be
somewhat illusory. Whitehead did not believe we can live on the basis of either model. He
believed that our theory should support our practices, or be set aside as inadequate.
7 This,  more than anything else,  is  the basis of  what I  will  call  Whitehead’s speculative
pragmatism. Whitehead was certainly not the only speculative pragmatist. Whitehead was
influenced by James’s speculation, and though he knew little or nothing of Peirce from
what  we  can tell,  Charles  Hartshorne  later  began to  point  out  the  marked parallels
between Whitehead and Peirce.1
8 The model of subjectivist sensationism is a set of twin principles, as Whitehead saw it.
9 On the one hand, there was an ontological analysis that Whitehead referred to as the
subjectivist principle, which in the modern form saw the self’s experience as analyzed purely
in terms of the sense impressions.2 The second doctrine,  which Whitehead called the
sensationist  principle,  said  that  the  subject’s  experience  lacked what  Whitehead called
subjective form.3
10 The subjectivist principle is rooted in
three premises: (i) The acceptance of the ‘substance-quality’ concept as expressing
the ultimate ontological principle. (ii) The acceptance of Aristotle’s definition of a
primary substance, as always a subject and never a predicate. (iii) The assumption
that the experient subject is a primary substance. (Whitehead 1978: 157)
11 Whitehead rejected all three of these beliefs.
12 Plato and  Aristotle,  he  believed,  came  to  accept  this  viewpoint  because  of  their
overconfidence in the power of everyday language to disclose the nature of reality. It is
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all too natural to move from descriptions of the world in terms of subject and predicate to
a  description  of  the  nature  of  reality  as  qualities  inhering  in  underlying  enduring
substances.
13 Analyzing  the  world  through  the  lens  of  subject-predicate  propositions,  these
philosophers made a distinction between universals and particulars, with the subjects of
these propositions becoming known as primary substances, or what Whitehead would call
actual entities, and the predicative qualities being recognized as universals.
14 The last point in this set is that self-analysis in modern philosophy took the experiencing
subject to be one of these actual entities that was an enduring substance standing by itself
apart from other actual entities in the world. Whitehead said that Descartes took it one
step further in that direction by declaring that such substances “required nothing but
themselves to exist” (Whitehead 1978: 159).
15 Whitehead gives Descartes credit for making “the greatest philosophical discovery since
the age of Plato and Aristotle” (Whitehead 1978: 159) when he developed the subjectivist
bias in philosophy and insisted that philosophy begin with the analysis of self-experience.
But it was left to others, such as James and Bergson, to begin to put the subjectivist bias
more fully into practice. Descartes missed the boat, for as Whitehead put it:
But like Columbus who never visited America, Descartes missed the full sweep of his
own discovery, and he and his successors, Locke and Hume, continued to construe
the  functionings  of  the  subjective  enjoyment  of  experience  according  to  the
substance-quality categories. (Whitehead 1929: 159)
16 Rather than relying on the analysis of ordinary language, and the categories derived from
it,  Descartes  and  the  later  modern  philosophers  including  Kant,  should  have  taken
subjective  analysis  more  seriously  and  developed  what  might  be  called  existential
categories based more fully on, and therefore more adequate to, our actual experience.
17 These subject-substances, never being predicates, were completely separate and distinct
entities. They lacked an objective element. Unlike our everyday experience in which the
boundaries  between  us,  our  bodies,  and  the  world  beyond  are  blurred,  the  subject-
substance ontology led to a doctrine of merely external relations of entities abstractly
separated from one another.
18 This  subject-substance  ontology  was  then  fatally  combined  with  a  sensationist
epistemology. Whitehead initially discusses this sensationist principle in terms of “the bare
subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid of any subjective form” (Whitehead 1978:
157). The importance of every element of this definition, just like the definition for the
subjectivist principle, only unfolds over the next few pages of Whitehead’s explanations.
The sensationist principle, like the subjectivist principle, has two parts. The first is again
methodological, for Whitehead approves of the general modern approach to the problem.
A  theory  of  knowledge  was  also  needed.  Again  philosophy  started  on  a  sound
principle,  that  all  knowledge  is  grounded  on  perception.  Perception  was  then
analyzed, and found to be the awareness that a universal quality is qualifying a
particular substance. Thus perception is the catching of a universal quality in the
act of qualifying a particular substance. (Whitehead 1978: 158)
19 Whitehead agrees that the development of an adequate theory of perception was the
place to begin.4 The problem,  however,  is  that  it  was a  “doctrine of  mere sensation”
(Whitehead  1978:  157).  This  was  Locke’s  blank  slate  upon  which  sense impressions,
detached from objective actual entities, fall. The result of this subjectivist sensationism was
the mind-body problem and skepticism about our interaction with a real, objective world.
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20 When Whitehead criticized the modern sensationist analysis of perception as “the bare
subjective entertainment of the datum,” he meant that such perception was deemed to be
completely subjective. There was no objective element, and this is part of what led to the
modern difficulties in philosophy. Whitehead believed that “Descartes’ discovery on the
side of subjectivism requires balancing by an ‘objectivist’ principle as to the datum for
experience” (Whitehead 1978:  160).  Thus,  Whitehead proposed a  reformed subjectivist
principle that begins,  as Descartes did,  with an analysis of the act of experience, but
recognizes  an  objective  datum  in  that  experience.  For  “common  sense,”  Whitehead
commented, “is inflexibly objectivist” (Whitehead 1978: 158).
21 His speculative pragmatism, again, requires that we be able to live by the theory that we
develop,  or we must revise the theory.  We cannot live as if  there were no objective
component in our experience.
22 Whitehead’s analysis of perception parallels developments in phenomenology in some
ways. He says that, if we leave the abstraction of a claim like “the stone is grey” behind
and look at what the genuine experience is, we’ll find that we originally experience “my
perception  of  this  stone  as  grey.”  With  this,  we  see  that  Whitehead  recognizes  the
intentionality of perception. My perception is of an objective element in my environing
world  that  has  entered  into  my  experience.  The  perception  is  the  self’s  activity  of
encountering an objective world that in some ways imposes itself upon us. The modern
analysis  abstracts  from the  self’s  active  encounter  and  interaction  with  a  world,  an
objective  datum,  and  leaves  us  with  a  bare  “awareness  of  sensation  of  greyness”
(Whitehead 1978: 159). Furthermore, the modern theory then assigns the vehicle for such
awareness of the world to the sense organs.
23 The  emphasis  in  modern  philosophy  has  always  been  on  knowledge  and  conscious
thought.  For  Whitehead,  conscious  thought  is  but  the  tip  of  the  iceberg  in  human
experience,  and  one that  is  fleeting  at  that.  It  comes  and  it  goes,  but  we  keep  on
experiencing and expressing ourselves with or without consciousness.
24 What is most vivid to consciousness are the sense impressions abstracted from process.
With these sense impressions, we picture an extensive continuum of color and shape, but
this image is an illusion. It is not the objective world that is an illusion. It is the sensory
image that we abstract from the objective process that is illusory with regard to the
underlying nature of things. Modern science has, from the beginning, operated from the
principle that things are not the way that they appear to us through the senses. We must
peel away the layers of the onion to understand the underlying structure.5
25 The appearance of an extensive continuum is the result of the activities of many atomic
entities in interaction with one another. We emphasize “the green leaf” as it is lifted up
to consciousness and leave behind the vague awareness of the activities that result in the
appearance of a green leaf (Whitehead 1978: 167). Whitehead, by contrast, wanted to lift
the veil off of unconscious experiences of connection to the world and our past selves. He
wrote:
The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant’s philosophy. The Critique of
Pure  Reason  describes  the  process  by  which  subjective  data  pass  into  the
appearance of an objective world […]. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject;
The Social Self of Whitehead’s Organic Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-1 | 2010
4
for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world – a superject 
rather than a subject. (Whitehead 1978: 88)
26 Whitehead had proposed a rethinking of perception, and his new theory of perception
would be based on felt involvement in and with an objective world that would result in an
expression of the self as superject in the experience of future occasions of experience.
27 When we focus on the greyness of the stone, or the greenness of the leaf, we are focusing
on what is most vividly apparent to us in the moment. Whitehead called this perception in
the mode of presentational immediacy. Very much like what Martin Heidegger called present-
at-hand experience, this is just looking at something. It is a snapshot of an instant in the
space-time continuum. Whitehead believed that while this snapshot view of the universe
can be very useful for the achievement of practical ends, it is very misleading if taken to
be indicative of the nature of reality. Hume was correct to believe it leads to complete
skepticism, and that one cannot live on the basis of this theory.
28 Whitehead did not believe that we are limited to experience of such snapshot views of
sense impressions of the universe. Hume was right, again, to suggest that “nothing is to
be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverable as an element in
subjective  experience” (Whitehead 1978:  166).  Hume,  however,  was  not  consistent  in
following his own dictum. Hume speaks of inheritance and memory, but there is no sense
impression of either. Hume denies there is a self, but attributes a bundle of perceptions to
something that has the capacity to inherit and remember those past experiences. There is
supposedly no self in Hume, but there is something that associates ideas.
29 Whitehead, like Hume, believed that there was no enduring soul-substance that stayed
the same over time. We change with every experience we have. He agreed with Hume,
and  William  James,  that  there  is  a  thread  of  continuity  between  drops  of  personal
experience. Building on James’s work, in particular, Whitehead wrote, “The final facts
are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex
and interdependent” (Whitehead 1978: 18).
30 Persons are made of a series of such drops of experience that inherit experience one after
the other. Whitehead believed that such inheritance and memory was the most obvious
example of a mode of perception that is more fundamental and concrete than the mode of
presentational  immediacy.  He  called it  perception  in  the  mode  of  causal  efficacy.  It  is  the
awareness  of  the  causal,  physical  power  of  actual  entities  from our  immediate  past
influencing or conditioning our present moment of becoming.
31 We are also aware, however vaguely,  of the causal influence of actual entities in our
environment  as  they  condition  our  present  moment  of  becoming.  But  these  causal
influences are filtered through our body and we lift and arrange sense data to higher
levels of con sciousness in order to picture and understand these influences, but those
pictures  are  abstractions  from  the  real  process.  Through  our  encounters  with  the
environing world, we come to relate our sense impressions with what has been perceived
as causally efficacious through what Whitehead calls symbolic reference (Whitehead 1978:
168).
32 Whitehead argues that  the second most  common form of  perception in the mode of
causal efficacy is the experience of our own bodies. And he points to Hume for evidence of
this.  Hume,  while  insisting  that  all  evidence  must  originate  with  sense  impressions,
writes:
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I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the
distinction of  substance and accident,  and imagine we have clear ideas of  each,
whether  the idea of  substance be derived from the impressions  of  sensation or
reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after
what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a
sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. (Hume 1896: 15-6)
33 Whitehead points to the way in which Hume takes it as given that we see with our eyes,
hear with our ears, taste with the tongue, and so on. According to Hume’s own standards,
displayed in this passage to critique the idea of substances, he should have no recourse to
discussing such withness of the body in relationship to perception of the external world. We
have no sense impressions of this “withness” (Whitehead 1978: 118).
34 We also, Whitehead insists, have a sense of intimate identity with our own bodies.
As to the direct knowledge of the actual world as a datum for the immediacy of
feeling, we first refer to Descartes in Meditation I, “These hands and this body are
mine”; also to Hume in his many assertions of the type, we see with our eyes. Such
statements witness to direct knowledge of the antecedent functioning of the body
in  sense-perception.  Both  agree  –  though  Hume  more  explicitly  –  that  sense-
perception of the contemporary world is accompanied by perception of the withness
of  the  body.  It  is  this  withness  that  makes  the  body the  starting  point  for  our
knowledge  of  the  circumambient  world.  We  find  here  our  direct  knowledge  of
causal efficacy. Hume and Descartes in their theory of direct perceptive knowledge
dropped  out  this  withness  of  the  body;  and  thus  confined  perception  to
presentational immediacy. (Whitehead 1978: 81)
35 Hume even speaks of degrees of force and vivacity of various sensations that derive from
this withness of the body, thus suggesting that he is aware of the causal efficacy of the
source  of  these  sensations.6 The  phenomenal  account  of  knowledge  is  nearly  always
supplemented in some manner by an appeal to an objective source of those sensations.
Whitehead confronts this head-on when he writes of perception in the mode of causal efficacy
.
36 In  summation of  this  section,  then,  for  Whitehead,  there  are  two primary modes  of
perception: the mode of presentational immediacy and the mode of causal efficacy. The
highly abstract picture-world of presentational immediacy is then related to the more
vague feelings of causal power coming from our past experiences and encounter with an
environing world through the process of symbolic reference.
37 Error enters our accounts through this symbolic reference. No one can live as if there
were not causally efficacious entities in our environing world, and no one can seriously
challenge my sincere reports  of  the sensations that  I  perceive,  as  sensations.  But  the
matching of sensation to a causally efficacious source, and the explanation of the real
nature  of  that  source,  may  indeed  be  questioned,  fleeting  activities  of  individual
occasions of experience.
⁂
38 There are two senses of the self that we are dealing with here: the spatial and temporal.
What I am calling the spatial aspect of the self involves withness and mineness of the body.
In other words, it involves a certain degree of identity of the self with the body.
39 This  could  be  interpreted  from a  Cartesian  point  of  view.  Descartes  understood  the
physical world from the point of view of the physics of his time. The body, on that view, is
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made  up  of  physical  substances  that  are  merely  extended.  They  are  “vacuous”  as
Whitehead put it (Whitehead 1978: xiii). They have no experience and no purpose. These
bits of matter simply are. Any interaction between these physical substances is external,
like billiard balls bumping into one another. The view of a collection of such physical
substances is the interpretation of “Nature lifeless” (Whitehead 1938: 127-47).
40 The view of the universe as consisting of bits of matter that are extended, inert, lifeless,
valueless, and purposeless, Whitehead termed scientific materialism (Whitehead 1925: 17).
According to scientific materialism, the world consists of bits of matter, understood as
enduring substances, in empty space. Each bit of matter occupies a definite location in
that space that is occupied by no other entity. Each substance was qualified by certain
qualities.  Empty  space  was  understood as  an unchanging container  for  these  bits  of
matter.
This is the grand doctrine of nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless complex of
facts. It is the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science. It is the doctrine which
[…] I am denying. (Whitehead 1938, 132)
41 This view has not survived scientific challenge through the centuries, however. Colors
and other sense data that are most important to us as human beings and artists were the
first to be dropped from the picture of the way things really are in the universe. Some
philosophers distinguished between primary and secondary qualities. Kant went to so far
as to suggest that we cannot ever know the way things themselves really are. The theory
of empty space has disappeared with our understanding of the transmission of light and
sound through the universe.  Newton’s idea of forces,  or stresses,  such as gravitation,
challenged the notion of merely external relations before quantum mechanics did. And in
the end, matter has been equated with energy. As Whitehead wrote:
The state of modern thought is that every single item in this general doctrine is
denied,  but  that  the  general  conclusions  from  the  doctrine  as  a  whole  are
tenaciously  retained.  The  result  is  a  complete  muddle  in  scientific  thought,  in
philosophical  cosmology,  and in epistemology.  But any doctrine which does not
implicitly presuppose this  point of  view is  assailed as unintelligible.  (Whitehead
1938: 132)
42 The  assailants  Whitehead  had  in  mind  were  those  early-  to  mid-twentieth-century
philosophers who embraced scientific materialism. Whitehead’s metaphysics were rooted
in  his  understanding  of  these  developments  in  science  that  transcend  scientific
materialism, and he saw an opportunity to bridge the gap in the mind-body problem.
43 By analogy,  Whitehead hypothesized an extension of  the Jamesian notion of  drops  of
experience from human beings to all actual entities. This goes all the way down the chain
of being to atomic and subatomic entities. Given the developments of electromagnetic
and quantum physics, he believed that it made more sense to assume that there is some
degree of experience in every entity than to assume there is none on the lower end of
being and that somehow, miraculously, experience sprang from nowhere.
44 He did not believe that aggregations of such occasions of experience such as rocks or bone,
etc., showed any sign of having experience, but he believed that the actual entities that
comprised  them  did.  A  particular  muscle,  for  example,  might  not  have  a  unity  of
experience that is aware of such collective experience, but the cells that make up the
muscle have such experience individually. He called an aggregation of such occasions of
experience a nexus (plural nexus). He described them as “public matters of fact” because
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due to their large numbers they appear to us as real individual facts of togetherness.
Their togetherness is due to mutual prehensions of one another (Whitehead 1978: 22-4).
45 Whitehead did not want to use the word apprehension to describe the interrelations of
these actual occasions of experience, because that might mislead people into thinking
that he thought all such occasions were conscious. He did not. He saw consciousness as a
particularly high order of experience in very complex organisms.  He chose the word
prehension to cover all  such experiences of  togetherness,  including unconscious ones.
These prehensions denote the internal relatedness of one entity toward another.
46 Some nexus display “social order” due to shared characteristics mutually prehended.
47 This  mutual  prehension  of  shared  characteristics  promotes  intensity  in  the  nexus.
Whitehead called these nexus with social order societies and described four major kinds of
society: enduring objects, corpuscular societies, structured societies, and living societies.
48 Some nexus can be analyzed apart from the wider social order in terms of their purely
temporal relatedness through a series, or ‘historic route.’ Whitehead calls these enduring
objects. Whitehead says that they could, loosely, be called persons because of the personal
order that is sustained over time in them. In fact, persons or selves are enduring objects,
but  not  all  enduring  objects  are  persons,  if  by  ‘person’  we  mean conscious,  or  self-
conscious, beings. Corpuscular societies are multiple strands of enduring objects. Structured
societies  have a subordinate society within a dominant society.  And living societies  are
structured societies with living nexus.
49 Given this nesting of societies, one within the other, in Whitehead’s view of the world,
one could say that the universe is a vast network of experiential entities in relationship
with one another. Hence the term panexperientialism has also been used to describe one of
the  dominant  characteristics  of  Whitehead’s  philosophy  of  organism.  Evolution,
according  to  Whitehead,  has  been  in  the  direction  of  more  and  more  complex  and
creative unities of experience over time. For this reason, he was critical of the idea that
evolution is driven by the principle of survival of the fittest.
A rock is nothing else than a society of molecules, indulging in every species of
activity open to molecules. I draw attention to this lowly form of society in order to
dispel  the  notion  that  social  life  is  a peculiarity  of  the  higher  organisms.  The
contrary is the case. So far as survival value is concerned, a piece of rock, with its
past  history  of  some  eight  hundred  million  years,  far  outstrips  the  short  span
attained  by  any  nation.  The  emergence  of  life  is  better  conceived  as  a  bid  for
freedom on the part of organisms, a bid for a certain independence of individuality
with  self-interests  and  activities  not  to  be  construed  purely  in  terms  of
environmental  obligations.  The  immediate  effect  of  this  emergence  of  sensitive
individuality has been to reduce the term of life for societies from hundreds of
millions of years to hundreds of years, or even to scores of years. The emergence of
living  beings  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  superior  survival  value  either  of  the
individuals, or of their societies. (Whitehead 1927: 64-5)
50 Evolution, Whitehead insists, would have stopped at rocks if the main issue were survival
of the fittest. The main issue is something else that he once called the art of life (Whitehead
1929: 4).
51 Human beings are a particularly complex society that is an example of a living society.
The human body has adjusted over time to changes in the environment, allowing a
dominant,  personally  ordered,  enduring  object,  which we could refer  to as  the self,  to
emerge. The self is nested within a relatively friendly environment. With the body, it
forms a society. The body is nested within a relatively friendly environment. With this
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environment, it forms a society. There are other human beings within that environment.
The community of  human beings forms a society.  All  of  this  relative security within
relatively friendly environments provides the human being the luxury to experiment
creatively with new ideas.
52 The problem of how the self, as mind, relates to the body is solved within this scheme. If
every actual entity has some degree of experience, and the actual entities of the body
form a society that is conducive to the development of the self, then the whole network is
a communicative network of sorts. The cells of the body communicate with the cells of
the brain. The cells of the brain communicate with the enduring object with personal
order that we are referring to as the self. The enduring, sentient self as subject and agent
within an environing network of communication is conditioned by that environment, and
provides some direction to that environment in turn.
⁂
53 The personally ordered, enduring object that is the self is just one example among many
kinds of enduring objects. An electron is an enduring object with very little complexity
and very little change over time. It repeats a vibratory pattern along the thread of its
personal history. The human self is more complex, but our analysis of an actual entity,
with the self in mind, will touch on all actual entities in the process.
54 An enduring object is a purely temporal society. The self is an enduring object within the
environment of a body that provides it protection and serves as a vehicle for action in the
environing world.
55 As a temporal society, it is not a self-same enduring soul that is the same from birth to
death.  The  question  of  personal  identity  must  be  addressed  as  part  of  this  overall
discussion. But before we get there, we should consider the nature of a single occasion of
experience  along  the  historical  thread  of  such  experiences  that  make  up  the  purely
temporal society that is the self.
56 Again, referring to James, Whitehead says that these occasions of experience come in
“drops.” Whitehead analyzes the phases of the becoming, or concrescence, of this occasion.
Whitehead saw that he owed an important debt to Kant in this analysis of the synthetic
becoming of a single act of experience. For Kant, as Whitehead saw it, is
the great philosopher who first, fully and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the
conception  of  an  act  of  experience  as  a  constructive  functioning,  transforming
subjectivity into objectivity, or objectivity into subjectivity; the order is immaterial
in comparison with the general idea. (Whitehead 1978: 156)
57 Kant, of course, had argued that our knowledge of the objective world was produced
through  this  constructive  functioning  out  of  a  subjective  experience.  Whitehead’s
analysis of an act of experience is also about a constructive functioning in that act, but it
goes  from an  initial  encounter  with  the  objective  world,  and  produces  a  subjective
account of it in the end.
58 There  are  three  major  phases  of  this  organic  model  of  becoming  as  a  constructive
function: conformal, aesthetic, and intellectual.
59 The first, or conformal, phase involves what Whitehead calls sympathetic, or conformal,
feelings. The world, and particularly the objectification of an antecedent occasion with
which the present occasion enjoys self-identity, is enjoyed in the sense of shared feeling,
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of feeling with.  The entire universe, including the antecedent occasion in the personal
order, is physically felt in its nature of being an efficient cause. This efficient cause enters
into the becoming of every occasion of experience as a conditioning influence. In the case
of some actual occasions, including that of the human self most particularly, there is
inheritance of an aim. This aim can be repeated, thereby gaining intensity, eliminated, or
modified in later phases of becoming.
60 The  second  phase  of  this  becoming  is  an  aesthetic  supplementation  introducing  a
valuation of  the universe  from the perspective  of  that  new organic  unity  that  is  an
occasion of experience. It is a phase of aesthetic appreciation of inherited rhythms and
patterns in its environing world, including the intensities of the antecedent occasion in
its own personal history. Some elements are valued highly, and some elements are swept
aside as unwanted. It is a phase of emotional encounter with the world, and results in
adversions and aversions. Whitehead says that if this phase is particularly strong, then
the third phase will be negligible.
61 The third phase of intellectual supplementation introduces a contrast of what is  with
what could be. It is here that the potential ways of being in the world (which Whitehead
terms eternal objects) that have already been actualized are contrasted with the potentials
that could have been realized, or might yet be realized. These potentials flood into the
second phase of an act of experience, but are not given attention as potentials. They are
simply  felt,  and  appreciated  or  depreciated.  It  is in  the  third  phase  of  intellectual
supplementation that the potentials are given attention as such. This is the phase of mind,
or  consciousness, in  Whitehead’s  thought.  With  James,  he  does  not  want  to reify
consciousness. It is but another way the actual occasion of experience feels the world.
This consciousness is not a substance.
62 This entire process is also guided by an initial aim that becomes, in the later phases, a
contrast between the ideal  for that situation,  and the feelings and functioning of the
occasion that is in the process of becoming. Caught in the interplay between personal
feelings of the actual world of that occasion of experience and a vaguely felt perception of
the ideal for that situation, decisions are made. The newly becoming occasion modifies
the course, and projects a modified aim for its subsequent occasion of experience.
63 There is a third factor in that decision that must also be considered: an inherited aim.
Whitehead says there are two forms of process, and this becoming of a single occasion of
experience is one of those forms. The other form is what he often terms the transition. The
individual occasion of experience begins in conformal unity with the antecedent occasion
in a historical thread of occasions. The occasion of experience ends as what Whitehead
terms a superject,  objectifying itself for conformal unity in a subsequent occasion, and
thus providing an inherited aim for the subsequent occasion of experience.
⁂
64 In the last section, this paper emphasizes the finite constructive act of experience that
begins with the inheritance of an aim under the influence of an environing world, an
initial ideal aim that guides the process of becoming as a final cause, and ends with a final
adjustment of personal aim in the context of that actual world.
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65 In  Whitehead’s  system,  the  final  real  things  of  the  universe  are  actual  occasions  of
experience. But there is a sense in which the entire universe is an occasion of experience.
“The many becomes one, and are increased by one” (Whitehead 1978: 21). And again,
There is the vague sense of many which are one; and of one which includes the
many. Also there are two senses of the one – namely, the sense of the one which is
all, and the sense of the one among the many. (Whitehead 1938: 110)
66 The finite can only be understood against the background out of which it arises and into
which it goes.
67 The background of an environing world, which for the human being includes the human
body,  is  discussed above.  But  for  the present  occasion of  experience,  there is  also a
temporal sequence that forms another important backdrop for its becoming.
A whole sequence of actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is such
that  each  occasion  embodies  in  its  own being  the  antecedent  members  of  that
sequence with an emphatic experience of self-identity of the past in the immediacy
of the present. (Whitehead 1948: 92)
68 This is no mere sequence, or stringing together of random events. There is an ordered
self-identity that acquires emphasis over time. “The life of man,” Whitehead wrote, “is a
historic route of actual occasions which in a marked degree […] inherit from each other”
(Whitehead 1978: 89).
69 This inherited identity is so strong that, ordinarily, in the short-term, we do not even
question this identity at all. During one of Whitehead’s talks, he said:
For  example,  take  a  many  syllable  word,  such  as  “overwhelming”  which  was
employed  in  the  previous  sentence:  of  course  the  person  who  said  “over”  was
identical  with the person who said  “ing.”  But  there  was  a  fraction of  a  second
between the two occasions. And yet the speaker enjoyed his self-identity during the
pronunciation of the word, and the listeners never doubted the self-identity of the
speaker. Also throughout this period of saying that word everyone, including the
speaker, was expecting him to finish the sentence in the immediate future beyond
the present; and the sentence had commenced in the more distant past. (Whitehead
1948: 92-3)
70 What occurs in the selection of a word, and the formation of a sentence is the selection of
values for realization in the world.
71 This  notion  of  personal  identity  is  not  a  concept  that  can  easily  be  done  without.
Whitehead was well aware of critics who thought that talk of occasions of experience
coming one after the other was not sufficient to explain our sense of self. He addressed
this problem directly.
Personal  Identity  is  a  difficult  notion.  It  is  dominant in  human experience:  the
notions  of  civil  law  are  based  upon  it.  The  same  man  is  sent  to  prison  who
committed  the  robbery;  and  the  same  materials  survive  for  centuries,  and  for
millions of years. We cannot dismiss Personal Identity without dismissing the whole
of human thought as expressed in every language. (Whitehead 1948: 94)
72 Personal identity, for Whitehead, is, in one sense, a new construction in every moment of
new becoming. The solution that he offers to the resulting problem of identity has to do
with the relationship of fact and value. The interaction of the world of fact and the world of
value are central to Whitehead’s understanding of the universe. It is value that persists
over time, while the functional activity of the individual occasion of experience arises and
perishes in a flash. These two worlds are bound together by Whitehead’s concept of the
idea.
The Social Self of Whitehead’s Organic Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-1 | 2010
11
(The) ultimate character (of the Universe) has two sides – one side is the mortal
world of transitory fact acquiring the immortality of realized value; and the other
side is the timeless world of mere possibility acquiring temporal realization. The
bridge between the two is the “Idea” with its two sides. (Whitehead 1948: 92)
73 The idea in Whitehead’s thought is a possible mode of being in the world. There are both
realized and unrealized ideas.7 But these are not to mistaken for Plato’s conception of
ideas.
The  notion  of  Effectiveness  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  understanding  of  the
World of Value. The notion of a purely abstract self-enjoyment of values apart from
any reference to effectiveness in action was the fundamental error prevalent in
Greek philosophy […]. (Whitehead 1948: 90)
74 So, for Whitehead, 
“Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value.” (Whitehead 1948: 88)
75 The functional activities of the self are experiential of value, appreciative of value, and
expressive of value. The world as it is received in any given occasion of experience is
sympathetically felt. It is then aesthetically evaluated. And finally, in some but not all
human experience, its values are consciously held in contrast to other values that could
have been or might yet be. The decision of that occasion of experience is expressed – both
to subsequent occasions of experience, and to the world via the body.
76 Over time, there arises a personality of this historic route of occasions of experience that
is a form of emphasis.
“Personal Identity” is exhibited when the change in the details of fact exhibits an
identity of primary character amid secondary changes of value. This identity serves
the double rôle of shaping a fact and realizing a specific value. (Whitehead 1948: 93)
77 In  this  way,  this  society  of  temporal  occasions  forms  a  “unity  of  style”  over  time.
Whitehead concludes that there are actually three ways in which we can speak of the self.
The first is the individual occasion of experience that is most concrete in its functional
activity. The second is the historic route of occasions that stretches from birth to death.
And,  finally,  there is  the unity of  style,  or  form, that  is  passed on from occasion to
occasion (Whitehead 1927: 27-8).
⁂
78 As noted above, in discussing evolution Whitehead is somewhat critical of the view that
evolution is driven strictly by survival of the fittest. He does not dispute that the fit survive
and that the weak perish. Rather, he points to the way in which the higher organisms do
not survive as long as lower forms of existence. Rocks, for instance, survive for millions of
years. There is another factor that has to be considered.
Why has the trend in evolution been upwards? The fact that organic species have
been produced from inorganic distributions of matter, and the fact that in the lapse
of time organic species of higher and higher types have evolved are not in the least
explained  by  any  doctrine  of  adaptation  to  the  environment,  or  of  struggle.
(Whitehead 1927: 7)
79 The emergence of sentience on the classical view of evolution is itself puzzling. That is
one of the reasons that drove Whitehead to speculate that it makes more sense to view
some element of experience all the way down, however faint it might be at the bottom,
rather than to wonder how it might have miraculously appeared later on. The whole of
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nature is organic, he concludes, and the notion of lifeless, inert, purposeless matter is
based on our macroscopic views of aggregates of actual entities.
80 The  upward  trend  has  not  primarily  involved  an  adaptation  to  the  environment,
Whitehead notes.
In  fact  the  upward  trend  has  been  accompanied  by  a  growth  of  the  converse
relation.  Animals  have  progressively  undertaken  the  task  of  adapting  the
environment to themselves. (Whitehead 1927: 7)
81 The upward trend in evolution (which has involved an increasing capacity to manipulate
the environment)8 has been driven by an increase in the capacity to enjoy intensities of
value.
[T]his active attack on the environment is a three-fold urge: (i) to live, (ii) to live
well, (iii) to live better. In fact, the art of life is first to be alive, secondly to be alive in
a satisfactory way, and thirdly to acquire an increase in satisfaction. (Whitehead
1927: 8)
82 This increase in satisfaction is an increase in the enjoyment of value. And Whitehead
observes that the most effective societies “involve a large infusion of various sorts of
personalities as subordinate elements in their make-up – for example, an animal body, or
a society of animals, such as human beings” (Whitehead 1927: 94).
83 So,  the  human  body  is  one  such  society  that  has  evolved  a  variety  of  coordinated
personalities for the purpose of greater intensities and enjoyment of value.
84 With Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, it is clear that there is a solution of the mind-
body problem. The self is part of a larger society that includes the body, and the entire
society in some significant ways functions as one organism. It is so successful at this that
we quite confidently speak of the body as being mine.
85 The self  would not seem to be directly connected,  however,  to the environing world
beyond the body. In fact, there is some question as to where Whitehead believed the self
resides within the body. If we supposed that the self resides somewhere in the brain,
though, then it would seem that the self only experiences and directly communicates
with the cells of that part of the brain. Communication with the rest of the body would be
indirect.
86 But  the  entire  body  is  mine.  Not  just  the  cells  with  which  I  am  most  directly  in
communication. My explanation for this would be that the Whiteheadian body is not only
a network of communication nested within the network of the greater environment, but
it is (as Whitehead said) a society enjoying social order due to shared character. The
shared  character  is  made  possible  by  a  sympathetic  bond of  physical  feeling  at  the
beginning  of  each  occasion  of  experience.  While  it  is  true  that  each  occasion  of
experience may emphasize different aspects of those feelings to be heightened for its own
expression of individuality, the bond establishes a common character.
87 By extension, we could say that the same is true for ever greater unities beyond the body.
Whitehead at one point called the body a “complex amplifier” (1978: 119). The body not
only relays signals from within the body, but also from outside the body. There is a filter.
We  do  not  pick  up  on  anything  in  our  environment  without  abstraction  and
simplification. We place emphasis on certain elements of our experience, and all of our
sense organs do as well. But we have the possibility of developing the ability of retaining
these sympathetic feelings with our environment through greater and greater ranges
over time.
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88 Ethically, this is significant. The social self in Whitehead suggests that the development of
sympathetic  connections  with  the  environment,  including  fellow  human  beings,  is
important  in  the  development  of  shared  value.  An  increased  emphasis  on  these
sympathetic bonds may lie not only at the heart of our ability to live well together as
human beings, but also to manage our environment with care.9
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NOTES
1. Hartshorne, along with Paul Weiss, worked as Whitehead’s T. A. at Harvard while they were
editing  Peirce’s  collected  papers.  For  one  example  of  Hartshorne’s  discussions  of  Peirce  and
Whitehead,  see  the  chapter  on  Whitehead  in  his  book  Creativity  in  American  Philosophy
(Hartshorne 1984: 103-13).
2. Whitehead’s discussion of these matters was very confusing. There has been a lot of discussion
through the years about how to untangle his  ambiguity.  I  have written about it  in my book
(Smith 2004: 90-132), and a paper co-authored by David Ray Griffin (Smith & Griffin 2003: 3-36).
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3. Whitehead called this the sensationalist principle, and some Whitehead scholars have shortened
this to the sensationist principle.
4. It is easy to see why Merleau-Ponty would have seen a kindred spirit in Whitehead when he
attempted to disclose the lived body through a new theory of perception. This is the work of
Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962).  More recently, Merleau-Ponty’s lecture “The
Idea of Nature in Whitehead,” based on Whitehead’s early philosophy of nature and metaphysical
works, was posthumously published in Nature (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 113-22).
5. In this  respect,  modern science hearkens back to pre-Socratic  natural  philosophy and the
attempt to understand the underlying nature of reality, not settling for easy answers as they
appear to us on the surface of sense perception.
6. In a related manner, Locke said that his sense impressions come from ‘something, he knows not
what.’ And Kant assumes there is a noumenal reality that is the source of these impressions.
7. Whitehead often referred to these ideas as eternal objects to distinguish them from Plato’s ideas.
8. It is increasingly apparent that the ability of human beings to manipulate their environment
may outstrip their wisdom to manage that manipulation with care. There may soon come a time
when the drive to enjoy value in the short-term will come at the expense of long-term value or
even survival.
9. Confucianism, for example, is based in part on the extension of identity through greater and
greater ranges of sympathy. The infant identifies with the mother, and then with the immediate
family. Over time, this sympathetic bond grows to neighbors and the community at large. There
is the hope, in the end, that one might be develop the characteristic of ren, represented by the
character of a person learning to live in harmony with others through this sympathetic bond.
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